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Abstract
This paper analyses how a case were to unfold if an
operator of a nuclear installation were to exercise its right of
recourse against a supplier in the event of supply of equipment or
material with latent defects, as envisaged under the unique Section
17(b) of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLND
Act), adopted by the Indian Parliament. This study is relevant as no
such right of recourse claim has ever been exercised yet by a
nuclear installation operator against a supplier, in the absence of
any contractual agreement—and yet, this is precisely what this new
law in India foresees as a perfectly valid legal option. The
uniqueness of this provision and many grey areas surrounding this
law have had a dampening effect on the global supplier market for
nuclear power plants in India, other than for the indigenously
designed Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors. This is why it is worth
dissecting how such a case were to unfold, should the Indian
nuclear power operator nevertheless decide to rely on this right of
recourse provision. Unlike the relationship between claims filed by
victims against the nuclear operator, the right of recourse claim by
the operator against the supplier would be governed by standard
tort law. We, therefore, evaluate general tort law principles as well
as case law derived from comparable sectors, such as the oil and
aviation industries, where any major accident is perceived as a lowprobability event, but with high impact on the society. In doing so,
we will also scrutinise the meaning of “latent defects” as defined
contractually, with the supplier’s obligation to remedy the defect,
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versus the monetary damage claim from the operator against the
supplier based on a latent defect after the occurrence of a nuclear
incident. Hence, this paper is intended as a guide for all
practitioners in the nuclear energy field, but it could also be of
interest to experts in comparable sectors, or even large
infrastructure projects.
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I. INTRODUCTION—NUCLEAR LAW AS A SPECIFIC SUBJECT
LAW DEVIATING FROM GENERAL TORT LAW
Before we delve into the key question underpinning this
study and examine how a case were to unfold before a court, if an
operator of nuclear installation in India were to exercise its right of
recourse against a supplier in the event of supply of equipment or
material with latent defects, as envisaged under the Civil Liability
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for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLND Act),1 it is worth reiterating
some of the basic principles driving the specific civil liability
regimes for nuclear damage internationally and how these have been
applied specifically in India.2
Given the complexity of any litigation which might ensue
after any major nuclear incident, potentially with transboundary
dimensions, most countries have agreed from a policy perspective
that general tort law may not be entirely well suited to the nuclear
energy sector. This is mainly because a nuclear incident is
inherently earmarked as a high-impact, low-probability event. This
is true for other sectors such as the oil and aviation sector as well,
where any major accident (with its low probability) will admittedly
have a high impact on society.3 From a public policy perspective,
governments have felt that it would impose an unjustified burden on
the public and its victims to file civil liability claims based on tort
law principles, with the requirement to establish negligence of the
defendant(s) and ensuing lengthy litigation. This gave rise to one of
the key nuclear liability principles: legal channelling of liability to
1 The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, No. 38 of 2010, INDIA CODE (2010),
https://indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2084?sam_handle=123456789/1362
(India)
[https://perma.cc/K59B-N8MX] [hereinafter CLND Act]. The Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage
Rules,
2011,
Gazette
of
India
(Nov.
11,
2011),
http://prsindia.org/uploads/media/Nuclear%20Rules/Civil%20Liability%20for%20Nuclear
%20Damage%20Rules%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5A2-KW2U] [hereinafter CLND
Rules].
2 Much has already been written about the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of
2010, the CLND Rules of 2011 and its possible interpretation, including, inter alia: See
generally Robert J. Gruendel & Els Reynaers Kini, Through the Looking Glass: Placing
India’s New Civil Liability Regime for Nuclear Damage in Context, 89 NUCLEAR LAW
BULLETIN 45 (2012) [hereinafter Through the Looking Glass]; Mohit Abraham, NUCLEAR
LIABILITY: A KEY COMPONENT OF THE PUBLIC POLICY DECISION TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR
ENERGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (American Academy of Arts and Sciences et al. eds., 2014);
ELS REYNAERS KINI, INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRADE––INCHING FORWARD?, KEY DEVELOPMENTS
IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, CANADA LAW BOOK 101129 (Stanley Berger et al. eds, 2014);
ELS REYNAERS KINI, NEWS FROM THE FRONT LINES OF NUCLEAR LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
REGIONAL CONFERENCE 315330, (2015); M P Ram Mohan, Which Interpretational Route
Will the Supreme Court of India Follow When Faced with the Contentious Civil Liability
for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010?, 40 STATUTE L. REV. 249, 24965 (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1093/slr/hmy007
[https://perma.cc/AF85-P9WM];
M
P
Ram
Mohan, Nuclear Liability Law in India. An Appraisal of Extent of Liability, Right of
Recourse and Transboundary Application, 17 J. RISK RES. 1 (2013).
3 Bernice Lee, Felix Preston & Gemma Green, Preparing for High-impact, Lowprobability Events: Lessons from Eyjafjallajökull, A CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT (Jan. 2012),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environmen
t%20and%20Development/r0112_highimpact.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG7D-G77M].
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the operator according to which only the operator will be deemed to
be exclusively liable for nuclear damage, a legal fiction created
based on public policy in order to ensure the prompt compensation
for victims by the operator and to avoid a legal imbroglio for the
victims. This was also driven by pragmatic concerns of the
insurance sector to ensure that only the operator would need to take
out insurance and not all the other suppliers involved in the
construction of a nuclear installation and thereby allows “a
concentration of the insurance capacity available.”4
Without going in further detail we merely want to flag that
the U.S.—though historically a major supporter and influencer of
the international conventions relating to civil liability for nuclear
damage which contain limited right of recourse grounds against
suppliers, to protect the interests of U.S. supplier companies
engaged in the nuclear energy sector in other countries—opted
domestically for a system based on economic channelling in its
Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, 1957 (PriceAnderson Act), a system akin to legal channelling.5 Under this
economic channelling model, the operator must take out an
“omnibus coverage,” encompassing his own third-party liability as
well as that of the suppliers, but where the right of victims to sue the
supplier directly has remained intact (in line with general tort law).
It is also noteworthy that the rationale of the principle of legal
towards the operator, which by and large excludes the liability of
the suppliers, is increasingly being questioned by certain authors.6
Importantly, in domestic and international nuclear law, the
operator of a nuclear installation will be held liable without a victim
4

For a detailed analysis of the nuclear liability principles: INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY, HANDBOOK NUCLEAR LAW 109-16 (2003) [hereinafter IAEA]; pertaining to Paris
regime, see also Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, NUCLEAR ENERGY
AGENCY, https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-convention.html [https://perma.cc/WM5T3EG4].
5 The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat.
576 (1957).
6 See generally Evelyne Ameye, Channelling of Nuclear Third Party Liability
Towards the Operator: Is it Sustainable in a Developing Nuclear World or Is There a Need
for Liability of Nuclear Architects and Engineers?, 19 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 33
(2010); Evelyne M. Ameye, United States and India: Two Nuclear States with Legislation
That Truly Holds Responsible Parties Liable in Case of a Nuclear Accident, 18 J. RISK
RESEARCH 1070 (2014),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13669877.2014.971421
[https://perma.cc/7C9H-GPG2].
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establishing the negligence of the operator. This principle of strict
liability is an important alleviation of the burden of proof otherwise
resting on a plaintiff. As we will discuss below, this principle of
strict or absolute liability governs the legal relationship between the
operator and the victim, but not that of the operator vis-à-vis the
supplier when the operator relies on his right of recourse, which is
elaborately discussed in the later sections.
As is well-known, the Indian Supreme Court adopted the
far-reaching environmental liability concept of absolute liability for
enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities.
The enterprises will be held absolutely liable to compensate those
affected by an accident (for instance, in the case of accidental
leakage of a toxic gas) and such liability will not be subject to any
of the exceptions (that is, act of God, act of third party, consent of
victim and statutory authority) under the tort principle of strict
liability in Rylands v Fletcher.7 Hence, the notion of strict liability
is not unique to the nuclear energy sector as such but can be found
back in many jurisdictions when the civil liability of industries
engaged in inherently hazardous activities is addressed, albeit with
high-impact, low-probability type incidents related to these sectors.
Another nuclear law principle which in some way is a
corollary or a trade-off of the unique legal channelling mechanism
is that the liability of the operator will be limited both in amount as
well as in time. Under the general tort law, there would not be such
a capped liability amount for a defendant, and the only time
limitation would be the one calculated as per the respective general
laws of limitation applicable to tort laws, predefining the time
within which any plaintiff would need to file its claim for damages.
The limitation of liability in amount for the operator, necessarily
implies that the State will step in and pay compensation to the
victims in case the compensation amounts exceed the statutory
determined liability amounts of the operator, an aspect which is
often explicitly addressed in domestic laws, including in the CLND
Act.8
Other nuclear liability principles which one finds in the
nuclear liability conventions are: the need for the operator to have
an insurance or other financial security covering its specified
7
8

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 (India).
IAEA, supra note 4, at 113; see also CLND Act, supra note 1, at §7.
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liability amount at all times, which is often referred to as the
congruence principle between liability and coverage; and which has
also been embedded in the CLND Act.9
To further ensure smooth handling in case of claims by
victims in the event of a nuclear incident, the nuclear liability
conventions require that each country clearly ensures that only one
court or body with the necessary authority will have jurisdiction
over such cases.10 The CLND Act provides that the Claims
Commissioner or the Nuclear Damage Claims Commission will be
adjudicating such claims.11 Because many domestic laws pertaining
to civil liability for nuclear damage may not necessarily address
jurisdictional aspects in the event of a nuclear incident with
transboundary ramifications (but to which their domestic private
international law principles would apply), the nuclear conventions
effectively harmonize this aspect by requiring that only courts of the
State in which the nuclear incident occurs will, as a general rule,
have jurisdiction.
Moreover, these conventions mandate
compliance with another nuclear law principle, to know, the nondiscrimination principle, whereby domestic laws and the civil
liability for nuclear damage conventions must apply equally to all
victims, regardless of their nationality, domicile or residence.12
Because of the unique characteristics of some of these
nuclear law principles which deviate from general tort law in very
significant aspects, these international conventions and domestic
legislations such as the CLND Act, must be viewed as lex specialis
(from the Latin saying: lex specialis derogat legi generali, i.e. a
specific law derogating from the general law). Judges must take
into account a rule of interpretation whereby the special law will
prevail over the general law.
It is rather beyond doubt that the CLND Act fully
incorporates the basic nuclear liability principles discussed above, to
know: (1) legal channelling of liability towards the operator; (2)
strict liability of the operator; (3) limitation of liability in amount;
(4) limitation of liability in time; (5) congruence of liability and
coverage; and (6) exclusive jurisdiction. However, as we will
discuss in depth in the sections below: Section 17(b) of the CLND
9
10
11
12

IAEA, supra note 4, at 114; see also CLND Act, supra note 1, at §8.
IAEA, supra note 4, at 115.
CLND Act, supra note 1, at pts. III & V.
IAEA, supra note 4, at 115.
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Act expands the right of recourse ground of the operator against the
supplier compared to the Paris and Vienna regimes beyond
situations which the parties contractually agreed. It is precisely this
open-ended nature of the right of recourse provision under the
CLND Act beyond the scope of the operator-supplier contract,
including, for instance, the contractual defect liability period, that
has had a dampening effect on the potential suppliers and the global
insurance industry to confidently enter the nuclear energy sector in
India.
Public policy discussions pertaining to the soundness of
excluding the nuclear energy sector from general tort law principles
can be traced back to the 1950s before the adoption of the
international conventions addressing civil liability for nuclear
damage, which we will discuss further below. Some of these proand-contra views were echoed in the Parliamentary debates before
the adoption of the CLND Act, which we will briefly touch upon as
well.

II. RIGHT OF RECOURSE UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION,
PARIS CONVENTION AND CSC
As per Article X of the 1997 Vienna Convention, adopted
under the IAEA regime: “the operator shall have a right of recourse
only—(a) if this is expressly provided for by a contract in writing;
or (b) if the nuclear incident results from an act or omission done
with intent to cause damage, against the individual who has acted or
omitted to act with such intent.”13 It further states that the right of
recourse provided for under this Article may also be extended to
benefit the Installation State insofar as it has provided public funds
pursuant to this Convention.14
Article 6(f) of the 1960 Paris Convention (as amended),
adopted under the auspices of the OECD, according to which the
operator shall have a right of recourse only: “i. if the damage caused
13

IAEA, Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/500 (Mar. 20, 1996) (adopted in 1963), amended by IAEA, Protocol to Amend
the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/566
(July
22,
1998)
(entered
into
force
in
2003),
https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/protocol-amend-vienna-conventioncivil-liability-nuclear-damage [https://perma.cc/53MS-GRGP].
14 Id.
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by a nuclear incident results from an act or omission done with
intent to cause damage, against the individual acting or omitting to
act with such intent; ii. if and to the extent that it is so provided
expressly by contract.”15
India is not a party to either the Paris or the Vienna regime,
but it did ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for
Nuclear Damage, 1997 (“CSC”) on 4 February 2016, which entered
into force in 2015.16 The CSC is open not only to States that are
parties to either the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage or the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in
the Field of Nuclear Energy, but also to other States provided that
their national legislation is consistent with uniform rules on civil
liability laid down in the Annex to the Convention.17 Hence, India
is an “Annex State” in the context of the CSC.
The right of recourse provision in the Annex to the CSC
(Article 10), just like under the Vienna and Paris Conventions,
foresees only two situations wherein the operator would have a right
of recourse, to know:
National law may provide that the operator shall
have a right of recourse only:
(a)
If this is expressly provided for by a contract
in writing; or
(b)
If the nuclear incident results from an act or
omission done with the intent to cause damage,
against the individual who has acted or omitted to act
with such intent.18

15

Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (1960), in
particular Article 6(f), as supplemented by the Brussels Supplementary Convention of
1963 (BSC), and revised by the Additional Protocol of 1964 and the Protocol of 1982,
under the auspices of the OECD (note that the 2004 Protocols to amend the Paris
Convention and the BSC are not yet in force), https://www.oecdnea.org/law/nlparis_conv.html [https://perma.cc/4HKR-US4E] and https://www.oecdnea.org/law/paris-convention-protocol.html [https://perma.cc/WFQ9-WT6M].
16 IAEA, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, IAEA
Doc. INFCIRC/567 (Jul. 22 1997), https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc567.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T38N-P4MX].
17 IAEA, supra note 4.
18 IAEA, supra note 16, at 38.
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As we will further discuss in detail below, the CLND Act has
quite uniquely inserted a third stand-alone ground, independent of
any contractual agreement between the operator and the supplier
with regard to the right of recourse, if the nuclear incident has
resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his employee,
which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent
defects or sub-standard services.
McRae explains when reflecting upon the CSC negotiations,
that not each CSC provision was intended to be equally mandatory,
albeit that for “some provisions and definitions, however, it was
determined that their treatment needed to be exactly the same in all
member countries in order to support an effective and protective
global regime. These provisions and definitions (relating primarily
to compensation, jurisdiction, and the definition of nuclear damage)
were included in the body of the CSC so that all member countries
must comply with them.”19 Conversely, for other provisions it was
understood that there could be domestic variations and they would
not need to be identical.20 Similarly, the IAEA’s Explanatory Text
to the CSC when touching upon the need to adopt national
legislation clearly distinguishes the different clauses in the Annex,
many of which cannot be treated as self-executing. More
specifically, when referring to Article 10 of the CSC on the right of
recourse, the chapeau states: “National law may provide that the
operator shall have a right of recourse only: ( . . . ),” which gives
each Annex State “the faculty to complement, or derogate from the
Annex’s provisions; in these cases, it is for each Contracting Party,
nuclear or non-nuclear, to decide whether or not it is its interest to
exercise this faculty.”21
Upon ratification, the Indian Government submitted the
following statement:
The Government of India, in accordance with
paragraph 1 of Article XVIII of the Convention,
19 Ben McRae, The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage: Catalyst for a Global Nuclear Liability Regime, 1 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 17, 24
(2007).
20 Id.
21 See CARLTON STOIBER ET AL., HANDBOOK ON NUCLEAR LAW (2003); International
Atomic Energy Agency, The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage—Explanatory Texts, 3 IAEA INT’L L. SERIES (2017).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

2020]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

293

declares that its national law complies with the
provisions of the Annex to the Convention; India has
enacted the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act
of 2010 to provide for civil liability for nuclear
damage and prompt compensation to the victims of a
nuclear incident through a no-fault liability regime
channelling liability to the operator, appointment of
Claims Commissioner, establishment of Nuclear
Damage Claims Commission and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010 complies
with the provisions of the Annex to the Convention
on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage.22
Importantly, the brief reference above to the right of
recourse provisions in the Vienna Convention, Paris Convention,
and CSC entails that such recourse by the operator against a supplier
is very much acknowledged under both the Vienna and Paris
regimes. However, in business practice, a right of recourse clause is
typically not inserted in the operator-supplier contracts. On the
contrary, exculpatory contract clauses or “hold harmless” clauses
will typically be negotiated whereby the operator of a nuclear power
plant will agree contractually to defend, indemnify and hold
harmless the supplier against any loss, liability, damage, or claim,
resulting from any recourse by any third party against the supplier,
arising out of a nuclear incident in connection with their contracts.
This further explains the unease with which the nuclear business
community looks at the expansion of the right of recourse under the
CLND Act.
Similarly, even bilateral agreements tend to exclude a right
of recourse provision, thereby making such right of recourse clauses
much less common than perhaps generally assumed.23
22 IAEA, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, (Feb. 4,
2016),
https://wwwlegacy.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp_reserv.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2U3D-NGZ8].
23 See e.g. PRE-LEGISLATIVE BRIEFING SERVICE (PLBS) (NOW: VIDHI), ADDENDUM TO
A BRIEFING DOCUMENT ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE BILL, 2010:
QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS OPEN TO PARLIAMENT 56
(2010),
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Perhaps this prevalent business practice in most jurisdictions
not to insert right of recourse clauses in operator-supplier contracts
should not come as such a surprise when one reviews the concerns
and suggestion on how to avoid supplier liability from the business
and insurance industry in the days before the adoption of the
liability for nuclear damage conventions. Indeed, several insightful
papers have analysed the historical origins of the limited right of
recourse approach as part of the Harvard Report
recommendations.24
The comprehensive Harvard Report, published in 1959, was
undertaken as a joint collaboration between the nuclear industry and
academia.25 In its Chapter on Private Arrangements to Limit
Suppliers’ Liability, it stated that:
[O]ne of the most widely discussed means by which
a supplier may seek to protect himself against
liability to third persons is the so-called ‘holdharmless clause.’ In its simplest form, this is an
undertaking by the purchaser of the equipment, the
licensee, or the operator of the atomic installation, by
which he assumes the financial responsibility for any
claims, of whatever nature and by whomever
asserted, which may be established against the
supplier on account of equipment or services
furnished by the latter to the installation. This clause
https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/2011/11/18/PLBS_Addendum%2520on%2520Civil%2520Nucle
ar%2520Liability%2520Bill
[https://perma.cc/U8TX-WEHL]
[hereinafter
PLBS
ADDENDUM] (referring by way of example to Article III the France-Russian Federation
Agreement (2000) and Article 1 of the Germany-Russian Federation Agreement (1998).
See also Gopalan Balachandran, Should India Sign the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation?, INST. FOR DEF. STUD. & ANALYSES (Oct. 26, 2010),
https://idsa.in/system/files/IB_IndiaCSV.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ6G-RCEJ] (referring to
Art. 13. of the India-Russia Intergovernmental Agreement which states that: “The Indian
side and its authorized organization at any time and at all stages of the construction and
operation of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units to be constructed shall be the operator of
the power units of the NPP and be fully responsible for any damage both within and
outside the territory of the Republic of India caused to any person and property as a result
of a nuclear incident during the transportation, handling or storage outside the NPPs of the
nuclear fuel and contaminated materials or any part of NPP equipment both within and
outside the territory of the Republic of India”).
24 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF FINANCIAL PROTECTION
AGAINST NUCLEAR RISK 95 (1959) [hereinafter HARVARD REPORT].
25 Id.
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seeks to put the purchaser or operator in the position
of an insurer of the supplier’s risk of liability.26
The Harvard Report further discusses some of the
challenges and limitations (including in the absence of a
legal/economic channelling regime) before concluding that
“suppliers cannot adequately protect themselves against many of the
risks of excessive liability inherent in atomic enterprises.
Legislative or treaty action would seem to be called for.”27 The next
Chapter of the Harvard Report then enumerates the areas where it
believes Government action would be desirable, starting with the
limitation of liability of the operator, while referring to similar
approaches in the aviation and maritime sectors, but also supporting
the principle that the operator’s liability should be based on strict
liability.28
The Harvard Report further addresses the need to limit the
liability of suppliers as well, anticipating protracted litigation
against operators and suppliers in the absence of a special regime as
“[l]itigation for that purpose will nevertheless be harassing and its
outcome might possibly be prejudiced by adverse public
sentiment.”29 Therefore, the Harvard Report concludes
[C]learly some corrective action is needed if the
manufacturing industry is expected to participate fully
in nuclear development. This does not necessarily
mean that suppliers should be entirely exonerated
from the consequences of any fault on their part. But
the public should look, for recovery in tort, to the
security fund established by the operator. Tort
recovery outside that fund would result in a
pyramiding of insurance costs, multiple recoveries,
harassing and often fruitless litigation . . ..
It continued by explaining that if “the operator is required to carry
compulsory insurance covering himself and his suppliers, then the
question of who is formally liable loses much of its practical
importance.”30 This, of course, reflects the construction adopted
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 42.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
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under the US Price-Anderson Act, 1957, where victims can sue
suppliers, but their liability is covered by the omnibus coverage of
the nuclear operator.31 Hence, with regard to the section on
exclusion of recourse actions in the Harvard Report, it states that
“[w]here actions against suppliers are not excluded, the insurance
industry would understandably prefer the Anderson-Price system,
under which operators and suppliers are covered by the same
insurance policy, for which the premiums are presumably paid by
the operator.”32 And, as a practical matter, “recourse suits by the
operator or by his insurers would, therefore, lack substance and
would consist of mere bookkeeping operations of the insurer.”33
We may merely flag here that the “joint risk management”
mechanism being proposed under the newly created India Nuclear
Insurance Pool (INIP), which we will discuss in the last chapter of
this Note, although very distinct from the Price-Anderson approach,
is common to the Price-Anderson approach in that it ultimately
seeks to move the potential operator-supplier right of recourse
claims out of the realm of litigation before regular civil courts and
into the field of a purely internal insurance settlement.
Most importantly, this 1959 Harvard Report concludes that
the “retention of a right of recourse seems neither justified nor
desirable, except perhaps in the extremely limited category of
intentional damage.”34 These US business concerns and positions
as expressed in the Harvard Report, undoubtedly would have
influenced the delegations in their discussions and negotiations of
the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.
As Faure and Vanden Borre explain, both with regard to the
1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Vienna Convention, the
argument according to which the right of recourse by the nuclear
operator ought to be curtailed was heavily influenced by the
reasoning that otherwise each supplier would have to insure himself
against the same risk already covered by the operator’s insurance
and “involve a costly duplication of insurance with no benefit to the
31

To read more about the US Price Anderson Act, see Michael G. Faure & Tom
Vanden Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative Economic Analysis of the
U.S. and International Liability Schemes, 33 WILLIAM & MARY ENVTL L. & POL’Y REV.
219 (2008).
32 HARVARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 57.
33 HARVARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 57 n.20.
34 HARVARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 58.
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victims.”35 This is precisely the complaint raised by many in the
international nuclear business and insurance sector against the
unique insurance mechanism being proposed by INIP in India, as
will be discussed below.
Turning back to the negotiations of the 1963 Vienna
Convention, Faure and Vanden Borre discuss how an amendment
was tabled with the proposal to allow the right of recourse by the
operator against any person having manufactured materials or
equipment or offered services in connection with the design,
construction, repair or operation of the nuclear installation.36 Under
this amendment, the operator would have a right of recourse against
his supplier only if he proved the negligence of the supplier based
on general rules of tort law. However, there was a lot of resistance
against this amendment, warning that in such a case the “promotion
of the atomic industry would be seriously jeopardised if the
amendment were adopted.”37 The proposed amendment was
ultimately rejected (including by the US, UK, Canada, Germany,
former USSR).38
Interestingly, the Official Records IAEA
pertaining to the convention negotiations, indicate that India along
with Argentina, Brazil and the UAE initially supported the insertion
of this amendment, but that India ultimately did not vote in favour of
it.39
Not unlike the discussions which took place in these
international fora, the parliamentary debates of India’s lower house
shed a fascinating light on the underlying concerns pertaining to this
right of recourse concept, as we will further discuss below.
Lastly, we may add that other Conventions pertaining to
other sectors where the owner/operator may be held strictly liable
and against which all civil liability claims will be channelled also
acknowledge the right of recourse against third parties (although
these sectors and related insurance mechanisms may be structured
35

MICHAEL G. FAURE AND TOM VANDEN BORRE, STUDY ON THE INFLUENCE OF PLANT
LIFETIME EXTENSION (PLEX) ON NUCLEAR LIABILITY 26 (2013) ,available at:
https://securedstatic.greenpeace.org/france/PageFiles/300718/Study%20%20PLEX%20nuclear%20liabili
ty.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXR6-VFLK] [hereinafter FAURE & BORRE, PLEX STUDY]
(referencing Exposé des Motifs, Motif 18, of the Paris Convention).
36 Id. at 26–27.
37 Id..
38 Id.
39 PLBS ADDENDUM, supra note 23, at 5–6.
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differently); such as is the case with the civil liability for oil
pollution damage40 or civil liability regarding the international
carriage of persons, baggage, or cargo performed by aircrafts.41 In
some of these conventions, however, the right of recourse provision
of the owner/carrier is drafted in a much more open-ended manner,
stated along the lines of “nothing in this Convention shall prejudice
any right of recourse of the owner against third parties.” 42 Thus,
the right of recourse of the owner/operator in some of the
conventions regulating similar low probability but high
impact/liability exposure industries, is not limited to a few grounds.

III. SECTION 17 OF THE CLND ACT: INSERTING A THIRD
GROUND FOR RIGHT OF RECOURSE FOR THE OPERATOR
AND RELATED PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
Section 17 of the CLND Act states that
[The] operator of the nuclear installation, after
paying the compensation for nuclear damage in
accordance with Section 6, shall have a right of
recourse where—
(a)
such right is expressly provided for in a
contract in writing;
(b)
the nuclear incident has resulted as a
consequence of an act of supplier or his employee,
which includes supply of equipment or material with
patent or latent defects or sub-standard services;

40 UNITED NATIONS, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR SHIP-SOURCE OIL POLLUTION:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
FROM TANKERS 142–43 (2012)
41 The number of aviation conventions are many, and, hence, the reference to the
1999 Montreal Convention and its right of recourse provision is singled out as a specific
illustration. See ICAO, CURRENT LISTS OF PARTIES TO MULTILATERAL AIR LAW TREATIES,
https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Lists/Current%20lists%20of%20parties/AllItems.asp
x [https://perma.cc/64ZL-VMGB].
42 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage art 3, Nov.
27, 1992 , I.L.M.; Montreal Convention of 1999 art. 37, May 28, 1999 (demonstrating
open-ended language of recourse in the context of air carrier liability); see also GIUSEPPE
CONTISSA AND GIOVANNI SARTOR, LIABILITIES AND AUTOMATION IN AVIATION 3 (2012)
(explaining the possibility of recourse in the context of aviation).
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(c)
the nuclear incident has resulted from an act
of commission or omission of an individual done
with the intent to cause nuclear damage.
As mentioned, Sections 17(a) and (c) of the CLND Act are
standard provisions and can be compared directly with Article X of
the Vienna Convention, Article 6(f) of the Paris Convention, and
even Article 10 of the Annex to the CSC. Moreover, each of these
international conventions restrict the right of recourse to the two
instances outlined in Section 17(a) and 17(c) only. Therefore, the
insertion of Section 17(b)—beyond the two “classic” ground of
recourse grounds—has caused much international consternation.
Indeed, there are a few other domestic legislations which
contain right of recourse provisions which slightly differ from the
Paris and Vienna Conventions language but are similar in approach.
For instance, the Republic of Korea in its 1969 Act on
Compensation for Nuclear Damage (as amended in 2001) states in
its Article 4 on the Right of Recourse:
(1)
Where nuclear damage is caused by the wilful
act or gross negligence of a third party, a nuclear
operator who has provided compensation for nuclear
damage in accordance with Article 3, shall have a
right of recourse against such third party, provided
however, that where the nuclear damage occurs due
to the supply of material or services (including
labour) for the operation of a nuclear reactor
(hereinafter referred to as ‘supply of material’), the
nuclear operator shall have a right of recourse only
insofar as there has been a wilful act or gross
negligence by the supplier of the materials concerned
or by his employees.
(2)
If, in the circumstanced described in
paragraph 1 of this Article, a special agreement has
been made regarding rights of recourse, such
agreement shall govern.43

43

Nuclear Safety Act, Act No. 10911, July 25, 2011 (S. Kor.).
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The original Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, 2010,
contained a differently worded Section 17(b), targeting the situation
in which “the nuclear incident has resulted from the wilful act or
gross negligence on the part of the supplier of the material,
equipment or services, or of his employee,” much like the law of the
Republic of Korea just quoted. However, during deliberations
before the Parliamentary Standing Committee, various experts
expressed the view that this provision needed to be redrafted in line
with provisions from product liability laws with a lower evidentiary
threshold compared to the situations of gross negligence that hold
the supplier liable for product liability, faulty design, faulty
manufacture, etc.44 The Parliamentary Standing Committee shared
the view of the experts according to which it would be impossible to
establish the “willful act or gross negligence” on the part of the
supplier45 and that therefore, “there should be a clear cut liability on
the supplier of nuclear equipment/material in case they are found to
be defective.”46
As a result, the Parliamentary Committee suggested that
Clause 17(a) and 17(b) be connected with the word “and.” This
proposal was ultimately not upheld by Parliament in the final
version of the CLND Act, but it clarifies that initially the intent was
to hyphen both sections, and that the right of recourse grounds as
foreseen in Section 17(b) would only apply if there was also a
contractual right of recourse clause agreed between the operator and
the supplier; and not in the absence of it.47 In other words: the
Committee did not envisage that Section 17(b) would become a
stand-alone clause, independent of an explicit contractual right of
recourse clause. This is further borne out by the Committee’s
statement according to which the operator “may, after,
compensating the victims, exercise his right of recourse against the

44

Robert J. Gruendel & Els Reynaers Kini, Through the Looking Glass: Placing
India’s New Civil Liability Regime for Nuclear Damage in Context, NUCLEAR LAW
BULLETIN, No. 89, 49–50 (2012). ELS REYNAERS KINI, CANADA LAW BOOK (Stanley
Berger et al. eds, 2014). For original sources, see DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY
STANDING COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT & FORESTS, 212TH
REPORT ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE BILL 5 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT
PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE].
45 REPORT PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 44, at 16.
46 Id.
47 REPORT PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 44.
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supplier in accordance with the provisions of the contract.”48
Therefore, the Committee assumed that such an explicit contractual
right of recourse provision would be a standard clause in operatorsupplier contracts; whereas, as we have mentioned above, this is
generally not the case in supplier contracts in the nuclear energy
sector. Quite the contrary: hold harmless clauses by the operator in
favour of the supplier are the norm globally, not right of recourse
clauses.
The Parliamentary Standing Committee ultimately
recommended that Section 17(b) should be modified as: “the
nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of latent or patent
defect, supply of subs-standard material, defective equipment or
service, or from the gross negligence on the part of the supplier of
the material, equipment or services.”49 In short, in this version the
product liability language was placed in addition to the eventuality
of “gross negligence.”
Importantly, the revised language Section 17(b) in the
CLND Bill presented to Parliament did not contain the connecting
term “and” between Section 17(a) and (b), but instead read as “the
nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act or supplier
or his employees, done with the intent to cause nuclear damage, and
such act includes supply of equipment or material with patent or
latent defects or sub-standard services; . . . .”50
In Parliament, one found a lot of criticism on the initial
recommendation by the Parliamentary Committee to connect
Section 17(a) and (b)—which was anyway not retained in the
revised version of the Bill presented to Parliament, as well as on the
new inclusion of the “intent” element in the final version of the
Bill.51 If one were to summarise the observations from various
48
49
50

REPORT PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 44, at 16.
Id.
Italics added to emphasize the portion which was not retained in the final CLND

Act.
51 LOK SABHA DEBATES, FIFTEENTH SERIES, VOL. XII, FIFTH SESSION, 2010/1932
(SAKA) NO. 22, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 25, 2010/ BHADRA 3, 1932 (SAKA) (2010) (inter alia:
“When the original Clause was amended further and when there was a suggestion in the
Standing Committee for strengthening Clause 17, what the Government did surreptitiously
was that they added one word ‘and’, and this particular word ‘and’ changed the entire
meaning of that Clause. When there was hue and cry, uproar outside Parliament, then the
Government removed the word ‘and’ and put another word ‘intent’ which further
weakened that Clause. If that word ‘intent’ remains in the Clause, how can anybody prove
the intent of the supplier?”).
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parties regarding Section 17(b), it would be that the government
should not absolve the supplier from liability, and, consequently, the
“intent” qualification was vehemently opposed by most as it
“substantially nullifies the supplier’s responsibility.”52
Other suggestions put forward to the Parliamentary
Committee reviewing the Original Bill, consisted of enlarging the
right of recourse in terms of the actors who could rely on such a
recourse.53 Given that India has adopted a capped liability structure
for the operator54 with the remaining compensation amount to be
paid to the victims to be provided for by the Central Government, it
was proposed that the Central Government should also be entitled to
rely on this right of recourse provision against the supplier for the
differential amount.55 As observed by the authors previously, it
“does tend to show that in fact a rather innovative review of the
notion of recourse against the supplier itself took place during the
public debate phase of the CLND Act.”56
Most parliamentarians were made aware that there were only
few countries with an extended right of recourse provision and that
this could impede their accession to standard third party civil
liability agreements, in particular the CSC, which the Government
may want to join at some point. However, the joining of the CSC
was not seen as a priority by Parliamentarians at the time, and many
felt India could not be rushed or bullied into doing so. In short, it
was felt that the compatibility of the CLND Act and the CSC would
be dealt with if and when India would need to cross that bridge.
Some went as far as stating that it ultimately was a “buyer’s
market,” and India should have the courage to dictate its terms.57
Only some lone voices expressed a concern that the law should not
be made so stringent as to scare away investors altogether,58 but that
possibility didn’t seem to carry the weight it now does.
If the above discussions were not controversial enough,
perhaps it is worth noting by way of historical addendum that
52

CANADA LAW BOOK, supra note 44, at 117–118.
See PLBS ADDENDUM, supra note 23, at 16.
54 Article 6(2) of the CLND Act, according to which “the liability of an operator for
each nuclear incident shall be (a) in respect of nuclear reactors having thermal power equal
to or above ten MW Rupees one thousand five hundred Crores.”
55 CLND Act, supra note 1, at art. 7.
56 CANADA LAW BOOK, supra note 44, at 118.
57 LOK SABHA DEBATES, supra note 51.
58 Id.
53
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several parliamentarians discussed the possibility of adopting an
unlimited liability regime or placing the liability amount at a much
more significant level. Nevertheless, the proposed amendment to
place the liability amount as high as Rs. 10,000 Crores (USD 1.65
billion) was ultimately voted against by a vast majority.59
In light of the above parliamentary debates which went at
great length in defining the precise contours of the right of recourse
provision, courts when faced with an interpretation of Section 17(b)
and relying on “external aids” would necessarily need to conclude
that Parliament in the end wanted to both expand and disconnect
Section 17(b) from the existence of any contractually agreed right of
recourse provision. That is, courts would need to apply it, even if
the parties had decided not to insert a contractual right of recourse
clause as per Section 17(a).60
Quite clearly, the discussions pertaining to the operator’s
right of recourse did not take the existing Paris or Vienna regimes
on civil liability for nuclear damage as a starting point. Rather, the
Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee states that it “has
been the unanimous opinion of the Committee that the Bill being a
domestic legislation should reflect Indian interests.”61
We must add that the subsequent CLND Rules tried to
reduce the scope of the right of recourse somewhat by specifying in
Rule 24(1) that with regard to the contract referred to in clause
Section 17(a) of the Act, such contract shall include a provision for
right of recourse for not less than the extent of the operator’s
liability under Section 6(2) or the value of the contract itself,
“whichever is less.”62 Rule 24(2) of the CLND Rules further
specifies that the provision for the right of recourse referred to in
Rule 24(1) shall be for the duration of the initial license issued
under the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection Rules), 2004 (which
is five years), or the product liability period, “whichever is
longer.”63 The “product liability period” is defined in Rule 24 as
“the period for which the supplier has undertaken liability for patent

59 Id. (merely 25 representatives voted in favour and 252 voted against this proposed
amendment).
60 KINI, INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRADE, supra note 2, at 119.
61 REPORT PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE, supra note 44, at 13.
62 GRUENDEL & KINI, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, supra note 2, at 51.
63 CLND Rules, supra note 1.
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or latent defects or sub-standards services under a contract.”64
Hence, this now does clearly allow suppliers to limit their exposure
to a period of five years. Rule 24 of the CLND Rules, with its sole
reference to Section 17(a) of the CLND Act, where a right of
recourse provision is expressly provided in a contract, clearly
implies that for the two other situations covered under Section 17 of
the CLND Act, there would be no such five-year time limit on the
operator’s right of recourse.
In other words: now that Section 17(a) and Section 17(b) of
the CLND Act are not connected with the word “and”, due to which
Section 17(b) must be treated as a stand-alone provision
independent of a contractual right of recourse clause, the operator
can exercise a right of recourse if a supply of equipment or material
with patent defects, latent defects, or sub-standard services has been
provided, thereby considerably broadening the scope of the right of
recourse of the operator under the law in India.65
As we have seen, a significant part of the Parliamentary
debates and expert submissions were devoted to adapting the notion
of the right of recourse of the operator against the supplier to the
Indian context and not merely to accept the standard language used
in treaties. While it was noted that expanding the right of recourse
provision may not be in line with what is generally prescribed in
international treaties on civil liability for nuclear damage, the more
persuasive common ground across party lines was that an operator
should effectively be placed in a position to sue a supplier if it could
be established that he would have supplied sub-par equipment or
services.66
Some of this debate is reminiscent of the original discussions
which took place before the adoption of the Vienna Convention in
1963, in which India took part and initially supported a version of
the right of recourse provision where the operator could exercise the
64

Rule 24(2)(b) further contains an “explanation” of the term “supplier” which “shall
include a person who—
(i)Manufactures and supplies, either directly or through an agent, a system, equipment or
component or builds a structure on the basis of functional specification; or
(ii)Provides build to print or detailed design specifications to a vendor for manufacturing a
system, equipment or component or building a structure and is responsible to the operator
for design and quality assurance; or
(iii)Provides quality assurance or design services.” CLND Rules, supra note 1.
65 GRUENDEL & KINI, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, supra note 2, at 51.
66 KINI, INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRADE, supra note 2, at 119–121.
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right of recourse “against any person who has manufactured
materials or equipment for, or who has furnished materials,
equipment or services in connection with the design, construction,
repair or operator of a nuclear installation, or who has transported or
stored nuclear material, for fault of such person”.67 As is known,
this version didn’t see the light of day, and other concerns,
particularly pertaining to the spiraling cost and multiplication of
insurance premiums, were more persuasive at that time.68
Remarkably, these financial implications for the suppliers or the
nuclear sector more generally merely formed a vague background in
the Indian parliamentary debates, and not a single elected
representative defended this economic point of view, and, thus, was
almost entirely ignored. This is in stark contrast with the focus of
the Harvard Report which was adopted in 1959 and has since cast
such a persuasive shadow on international nuclear civil liability
law.69 The Harvard Report in its foreword admitted that it
“inevitably reflects its American origin by its emphasis upon the
special problems of the US supplier . . . .”70 The discussions in the
Indian Parliament, almost 65 years after the publication of the
Harvard Report, clearly placed the public interest on the forefront
and arrived at an entirely different outcome in terms of the burden
to be shouldered by a supplier in the nuclear sector.71
In fact, the more direct implications of Section 17(b) for the
suppliers were never really analyzed, and many may not have fully
grasped that in fact suppliers worldwide have never had to take out
an insurance for their services/deliveries to a nuclear operator.
Indeed, as has been highlighted by several authors, industry reality
indicates that a contractual right of recourse clause is never inserted
in the contractual arrangement between a nuclear operator and its
67

PLBS ADDENDUM, supra note 23, at 5–6.
Id. For further analysis, see FAURE & BORRE, PLEX STUDY, supra note 35, at ¶¶
70–73; and AMEYE, supra note 6.
69 PLBS ADDENDUM, supra note 23, at 5–6.
70 The foreword further states: “Moreover, we believe that the examination of the
subject as it appears to the US supplier in the light of American law will be of value in
other nations which will be dealing with US suppliers in coming years.”
71 See, e.g. LOK SABHA DEBATES, supra note 51 (Mr. Prithviraj Chavan presenting the
CLND Act: “I would like to take this opportunity to clarify one thing. While the limits of
compensation are primarily for taking insurance, you cannot have insurance with no limits,
but the compensation is, in fact, unlimited. I want the House to note this fact, whatever the
compensation the Commissioner or the Commission will set, that compensation will be
paid.”)
68
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suppliers; bilateral agreements between countries exclude such a
possibility or other dynamics drive this reality.72
This raises the more poignant question whether the right of
recourse concept itself attracts sufficient review in international fora
regarding its true function, aim, utility, and ultimately underlying
policy. Whether or not one agrees with its implications, the Indian
parliamentary debates have the advantage of at least having given
the right of recourse notion a contemporary review, based on the
assumption that the Indian operator would very often not have the
contractual upper hand when negotiating this particular clause with
a supplier.73

IV. RIGHT OF RECOURSE OF OPERATOR AGAINST SUPPLIER
UNDER SECTION 17(B) BASED ON TORT LAW
There are a couple of key elements that must be culled out
from Section 17(b) CLND Act, according to which the “operator of
the nuclear installation, after paying the compensation for nuclear
damage in accordance with Section 6, shall have a right of recourse
where . . . the nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an
act of supplier or his employee, which includes supply of equipment
or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services.”74
We stated from the outset that nuclear law is a lex specialis
carved out from standard tort law (see discussion above), precisely
because it focuses on speedy compensation for victims and seeks to
avoid year-long litigation where victims have to prove the fault of
the operator or any of its suppliers. However, as much as the strict
liability of the operator and the channelling of the liability towards
the operator deviates from standard tort law principles, the same
cannot be said about the right of recourse provision where the
operator will have to establish and prove the applicability of the
situations covered under Section 17(b) before it can claim back the
full or partial amount it paid to the victims based on the Award
issued by the Claims Commissioner/Nuclear Damage Claims
72 PLBS ADDENDUM, supra note 23, at 13; AMEYE, supra note 6 (the author
conducted a detailed study by sending questionnaires to about 50 operators and 50
designers/constructors worldwide to collate their views on liability allocations in the
nuclear sector).
73 KINI, INDIA’S NUCLEAR TRADE, supra note 2, at 121.
74 CLND Rules, supra note 1.
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Commission. In other words: whereas the victims do not have to
establish fault of the operator, the operator will have to establish
fault of the supplier which possibly either supplied equipment or
material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services to
successfully rely on its right of recourse.
It must be noted here that the phrasing of Section 17(b) is
such that it states “which includes” supply of equipment or material
with patent or latent defects, or sub-standard services, and hence, is
not limited to those situations. This also implies if the contributory
fault of the supplier in causing the nuclear incident can be
established, Section 17(b) CLND Act can also be relied upon by the
operator to claim back some or all of the money paid to the victims.
It is also worth mentioning that whereas Section 17(c)
explicitly refers to both the act of commission or omission, Section
17(b) states that “the nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence
or an act of supplier or his employee” seemingly excludes omissions
which can’t quite be the case given that under general tort law
principles the notion of an “act” of a liable party will cover both acts
and omissions, as will be further discussed below.

V. TORT LAW PRINCIPLES
The principal aim of tort law is compensation of victims or
their dependants. The general principle of award of damages is,
therefore, compensatory in nature. At times, however, exemplary
damages can be imposed, and in that case the aim is more for
deterrence of wrong-doers.75
An action for breach of contract necessitates privity between
the parties to it, whereas in tort no such privity is needed.
Importantly, the same act may amount to a tort as well as a breach
of contract. Hence, once it is established that there was a latent
defect (which then subsequently contributed to the nuclear incident),
this factual proof may both entail a breach of contract as well as a
tort, although the consequences attached to each would differ. As
we have discussed above, the operator-supplier contracts in India do
not contain clauses pertaining to liability in the event of a nuclear
incident.

75

AKSHAY SAPRE, THE LAW OF TORTS 885 (LexisNexis 28th ed., 2018).
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Indeed, before the adoption of the CLND Act and in the
international practice of the nuclear field, the operator in India
inserted standard clauses on “Indemnity Against Loss/Damage” in
its contracts with suppliers, which stated that: “the Purchaser shall
indemnify and hold harmless the Contractor in respect of Third
Party life and Property damage claims arising out of nuclear event at
Purchaser’s Site.” However, after the adoption of the CLND Act,
operator-supplier contracts no longer contain such hold harmless
clauses. Such hold harmless clauses are, of course, very significant
otherwise as it is well-established that a liability in tort will not be
admitted if its effect would be to permit the plaintiff to circumvent
or escape a contractual exclusion or limitation of liability.76
It is good to keep the basic elements of tort law in mind as
we progress in our analysis. As is known, an act which infringes a
legal right is a wrongful act, but every wrongful act is not a tort. To
constitute a tort or civil injury the following elements must be
present: 1) A wrongful act must be committed by a person; 2) The
wrongful act must give rise to a legal damage or actual damage; and
3) The wrongful act must be of such a nature as to give rise to a
legal remedy in the form of an action for damages.77 The crucial
test of a legally wrongful act is its prejudicial effect on the legal
right of another. Keep in mind that under the law of torts, the
notion of “wrongful act” is used in a wide sense and includes both
acts and omissions. Importantly, to every right there corresponds an
obligation or duty. The duty with which the law of torts is
concerned is the duty to abstain from causing an injury, to respect
the property of others, and to use due diligence to avoid causing
harm to others.78
There are different types of torts, including trespass,
nuisance and negligence, which have each led to separate streams of
case law over the years. Negligence is the breach of a duty caused
by the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs would do; or doing something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.79 It is well-established that there are
three constituent elements of negligence, which the plaintiff must
76
77
78
79

Id. at 9.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 462.
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prove: (1) A legal duty to exercise due care (by the defendant
towards the plaintiff); (2) breach of the said duty (by the defendant);
and (3) consequential damage (suffered by the plaintiff).80 The test
for deciding whether the defendant breached his duty is that of a
reasonable or prudent man; albeit that this is a very contextual
benchmark, where the particular sector and level of expertise of the
defendant will be taken into account. Indeed, the question to be
asked with regard a person’s conducts is whether a prudent or
careful or diligent man of his calling or business or expertise or skill
would have undertaken the thing in question. In other words: if a
person holds himself out as being specially competent to do things
requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if
he fails to exhibit the care and skill of an expert in that business.81
Another important difference between tort law and contract
law is that many construction contracts contain clauses pertaining to
liquidated damages, which provide a pre-determined ceiling in order
to quantify damages which arise due to a breach of contract.
Conversely, unliquidated damages are damages that are payable for
a breach, the exact amount of which has not been pre-agreed.
Importantly, when there is a pre-determined amount, there is no
need to lead evidence to prove such damages unless the Court
arrives at a conclusion that no damages are likely to arise from such
breach.82 Indeed, in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., the Supreme
Court of India held that:
“ . . . it can be held that when a contract has been
broken, the party who suffers by such breach is
entitled to receive compensation for any loss which
naturally arises in the usual course of things from
such breach. These sections further contemplate that
if parties knew when they made the contract that a
particular loss is likely to result from such breach,
they can agree for payment of such compensation. In
such a case, there may not be any necessity of
leading evidence for proving damages, unless the
80

Id.
Id. at 485–487.
82 See ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 (India) (referring to the
lengthy interpretation of Liquidated Damages and case law in this Judgment by the
Supreme Court of India).
81
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Court arrives at the conclusion that no loss is likely
to occur because of such breach. Further, in case
where the Court arrives at the conclusion that the
term contemplating damages is by way of penalty,
the Court may grant reasonable compensation not
exceeding the amount so named in the contract on
proof of damages. However, when the terms of the
contract are clear and unambiguous then its meaning
is to be gathered only from the words used therein.
In a case where the agreement is executed by experts
in the field, it would be difficult to hold that the
intention of the parties was different from the
language used therein. In such a case, it is for the
party who contends that stipulated amount is not
reasonable compensation, to prove the same.”83

VI. LATENT DEFECTS: STANDARD CONTRACTUAL DEFECT
LIABILITY PERIOD/ REMEDY BUT DISTINCT LIMITATION
PERIODS FOR SECTION 17(B) CLAIMS
A.

Latent Defects And Latent Defects Liability Remedy As
Contractually Defined

Before we turn to the case law relating to the interpretation
of “latent defects” it is important that we understand the typical
meaning given to it in the context of contracts between the operator
and supplier (Purchaser-Contractor).
We will subsequently have to keep in mind different
scenarios and timelines attached to these terminologies, as foreseen
under contract and how it could be applied and interpreted to the
stand-alone Clause 17(b) CLND Act with its clear intent given by
Parliament to apply even independent of any contractual right of
recourse provision.
Here’s an overview in the Table below of key definitions
typically inserted in supply of plant and equipment contracts in the

83

Id.
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nuclear energy field in India, much in line with international
practice pertaining to infrastructure contracts:84
Term

Definition

Latent Defect

Shall mean a defect, inherently lying within the material or arising out
of design deficiency, which do not manifest themselves and/or was not
reasonably discoverable during the Defect Liability Period.

Contractor’s
General
Obligation(remedy
latent defects)

The Contractor shall design (to the extent specified in the Contract),
procure/ manufacture (including associated Purchases and/or subcontracting), install and complete the Facilities with due care and
diligence in accordance with the Contract and with the Purchaser’s
instructions, and shall remedy any defects in the Facilities occurring in
Defect Liability Period, and remedy latent defects within a further
period of five (5) years from end of the Defect Liability Period.

Defect Liability

The Contractor shall warrant that the Stores, Plant & Equipment
supplied under the Contract shall be brand new, free from defects,
manufactured with the latest state-of-art of manufacture and conform
strictly in accordance with the technical specifications, drawings and
data sheets of the Contract. No deviation from these specifications or
alteration shall be made without specific and written accord of the
Purchaser. All Stores shall be guaranteed to be of the best quality of
their respective kinds and shall be free from defects in the design
engineering, materials, workmanship, and be of specified size and
capacity so as to fulfil in all respects the requirements of the Purchaser
as specified in the Contract.

Defect
Period

Liability a) Items/Equipment/System
Defect Liability Period shall be 18 months from the date of completion
of facilities (satisfactory erection and pre-commissioning) or 12 months
from the date of Operational Acceptance of Facilities (Commissioning),
whichever occurs first, for each reactor unit.
In the event, the scope of work is limited to erection and precommissioning of the facilities and commissioning will be done by the
84 Note: these standard definitions have been copied from standard General
Conditions of Contract for Supply of Indigenous Stores, NPCIL, as used even after the
adoption of the CLND Act.
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Purchaser, then the Defect Liability Period shall be 18 months from the
date of completion of facilities (satisfactory erection and precommissioning) and handing over of the facilities for commissioning to
the Purchaser or 12 months form the date of commissioning of the
facilities, whichever occurs first, for each reactor unit.
b)Spares/Tools/Tackles/Accessories
The Defect Liability Period shall be 18 months from the date of receipt
of items (last consignment) at site or 12 months from the date of
acceptance, whichever occurs first.
Extension
of a) If the Facilities or any part thereof cannot be used by reason of such
Defects Liability defect and/or making good of such defect, the Defect Liability Period of
Period
the Facilities or such part, as the case may be, shall be extended by a
period equal to the period during which the Facilities or such part
cannot be used by the Purchaser because of any of the aforesaid reasons.
Upon correction of the defects in the Facilities or any part thereof by
repair/replacement, such repair/replacement shall have the Defects
Liability Period for a period of twelve (12) months from the time such
repair/replacement of the Facilities or any part thereof has been
completed.
b) In addition, the Contractor shall also provide an extended warranty
for any such component of the Facilities and during the period of time
as may be specified in the SCC. Such obligation shall be in addition to
the Defect Liability Period.
Latent
Liability

Defects At the end of Defects Liability Period, the Contractor’s liability ceases
except for latent defects. The Contractor’s liability for latent defects
warranty for the plant and equipment including spares shall be limited
to a period of five (5) years from the end of Defects Liability Period of
the respective plant and equipment including spares.
It may be observed that the above clauses and approach are
in line with the standard clauses suggested by some infrastructure
contract committees who prepare standard templates for ease of
doing business, such as the South African Joint Building Contracts
Committee (JBCC) of South Africa, where Clause 22.1 addresses
latent defects and states that “the latent defects liability period for
the Works shall commence at the start of the construction period
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and end 5 years from the certified date of final completion.”85
Moreover, such differentiation of latent defects and patent defects
with respective defect liability periods are standard clauses in
numerous infrastructure construction contracts in India, and is,
hence, a well-established practice.
Based on the above standard definitions and references to
“latent defects” which one finds back in contracts between operatorsupplier (Purchaser-Contractor) in the case of supply of
equipment/spares to an operator in the nuclear sector, the following
points may be noted:
a.
The focus is on remedying the defects when
discovered within a specified period; and
b.
The situations covered do not envisage a
nuclear incident. In other words: the defects need to
be remedied, within the pre-agreed time limits of the
Defects Liability Period—but repair/replacement is
assumed to be accepted to be the appropriate solution
between the contracting parties. This would (most
often) not be the situation in the event of a nuclear
incident which would have triggered the strict
liability of the operator to compensate the victims.
More specifically still: the right of recourse is not
sought as a remedy from the supplier for the
repair/replacement of equipment/spares; rather the
operator at that stage is seeking compensation for the
money paid to the victims.
c.
Hence, the reference to the contractual terms
of patent and latent defects in Section 17(b)—now, a
stand-alone clause independent of whether a right of
recourse was inserted as a Clause in the contract
between operator-supplier or not—is only relevant to
the extent of understanding what a latent defect may
85 See
JOINT BUILDING CONTRACTS COMMITTEE, https://www.jbcc.co.za
[https://perma.cc/8WJ6-QWPA]. For a detailed comparison of the JBCC, FIDIC and NEC
contracts, see Muhammed Somrey, Jason Gouveia & Courtney Jones, An Issue for
Interpretation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, in CONSTRUCTION LAW (Aug. 2017),
https://withoutprejudice.co.za/free/article/5720/view [https://perma.cc/K7WN-4KAX].
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mean, but is not intended to attach to it the
contractual consequences (repair or replacement)/nor
the time-limits specified in the Defect Liability
Period, because in principle now Section 17(b) can
be relied upon even beyond the time specified
contractually in the Defect Liability Period.
d.
Moreover, precisely because Section 17(b) is
a stand-alone clause, a Judge may appreciate the
definition given to “latent defects” in the operatorsupplier contract to understand the intent of the
parties but will ultimately be guided by the
precedents in his jurisdiction pertaining to “latent
defects,” which we will study in the section below
(see Section VII).
e.
It may also be worth noting that the definition
of “latent defects” given in the standard operatorsupplier contracts in India—as meaning “a defect,
inherently lying within the material or arising out of
design deficiency, which do no manifest themselves
and/or not reasonably discoverable during the defect
liability period”—is in line with the case law
pertaining to latent defects.
In summary, as is common practice in most infrastructure
contracts, the above clauses clarify that: the Contractor shall design,
procure/manufacture, install and complete the Facilities with due
care and diligence in accordance with the Contract and with the
Purchaser’s instructions, and shall remedy any defects in the
Facilities occurring in the Defect Liability Period, and remedy latent
defects within a further period of x number of years from the end of
the Defect Liability Period. Indeed, at the end of the Defects
Liability Period, the Contractor’s liability ceases except for latent
defects. However, the Contractor’s liability for latent defects
warranty for the plant and equipment including spares shall be a
limited to the agreed number of x years from the end of Defects
Liability Period of the respective plant and equipment including
spares.
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At times, infrastructure contracts don’t always distinguish so
clearly whether the Defect Liability Period (also referred to as
“defect notification period” or “defect correction period”) also
covers latent defects and whether the Defects Liability Period would
be longer for latent defects or not.86 As we have seen in the Table
above, however, most standard Purchaser-Contractor contracts in
India in the nuclear energy sector do contain clauses specifically
addressing latent defects, the liability for latent defects and the
defect liability period for latent defects.
In the absence of the CLND Act, any claim pertaining to
latent defects would be solely governed by what is contractually
agreed between the parties, including the agreed (extended) time
limit for latent defects within which a Purchaser can request the
Contractor to replace/remedy the latent defect. In other words, after
the agreed x number of years for which the defect liability period
for latent defects has been agreed between the parties, the liability
of the Contractor/supplier would extinguish and the Purchaser
would not be able to claim such replacement/remedy for latent
defects.
We may also add here that in the real estate sector in India,
insurance companies now also start to issue “Latent Defects
Insurance” (LDI) policies to cover the obligation to rectify any
defects (structural defects) under the Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), if claimed within five years from
the date of handing over possession of the unit to allottee by the
promoter or the builder.87 Such LDI policies taken out by property
developers are on the rise globally as a recent insurance trend.88
Interestingly, with regards to some of the LDI policy issued in India
in the real estate sector, the insurance company appoints an
86

Somrey, Gouveia & Jones, supra note 85.
SBI
GENERAL
INSURANCE,
Latent
Defects
Insurance,
https://www.sbigeneral.in/SBIG/sites/default/files/Downloads/Forms_and_Brochures/Broc
hures/Prospectus_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC7P-Z5GW]. For more information about
RERA (and Section 14(3) pertaining to the obligation to rectify defects), see MINISTRY OF
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REAL ESTATE REGULATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
ACT
(2016),
http://mohua.gov.in/cms/real-estate-regulation-anddevelopment-act-2016.php [https://perma.cc/M5S4-P7JG].
88 With regard to the real estate market in the UK, see Naresh Dade, Latent Defects
Insurance
is
On
the
Rise,
JLTSPECIALTY.COM
(Jan.
25,
2018),
https://landlordsinsurance.jltspecialty.com/en-bh/industry/constructioninsurance/construction-insights/latent-defects-insurance-is-on-the-rise
[https://perma.cc/J8GM-NMVR].
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“Independent Technical Inspection Service Company” to carry out
monitoring activities throughout the course of construction on the
quality of the building, which could range from sample design
checks to witnessing some tests at site (e.g. ultrasonic testing for
density of concrete, hardness tests, etc.), and the “Independent
Technical Inspection Service Company” will thereafter provide
detailed reports and feedback on the quality of the construction as
an independent expert party.89 As will be discussed below, such
practice of independent third party reviewed as part of the INIP
mechanism could evolve in the nuclear energy sector in India as
well.
B.
Distinct Limitation Periods Applicable Between VictimOperator Claims (CLND Act) And Operator-Supplier Claims (Tort
Law)
Let’s first recall that the CLND Act contains its own
limitation period90 in Section 18, within which a victim91 needs to
file its claim against the operator, which states that the: “right to
claim compensation for nuclear damage shall extinguish, if such
claim is not made within a period of: a) ten years, in the case of
damage to property; b) twenty years, in the case of personal injury
to any person, from the date of occurrence of the incident notified
under sub-section (1) of Section 3.”
Section 18 of the CLND Act also contains a proviso
clarifying that where a nuclear damage is caused by a nuclear
incident involving nuclear material which, prior to such nuclear
incident, had been stolen, lost, jettisoned or abandoned, the said
89

SBI GENERAL INSURANCE, supra note 87, at 4.
The Limitation Act, 1963, in its Section 2(j), distinguishes “period of limitation”
from “prescription period” as follows, “period of limitation means the period of the
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and ‘prescribed
period’ means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the
Act,”http://www.legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1963-36.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HS2N-EEBE].
91 As per Section 14 CLND Act, an application for compensation before the Claims
Commissioner or the Commission, in respect of nuclear damage may be made by:
(a)A person who has sustained injury; or
(b)The owner of the property to which damage has been caused; or
(c)The legal representative of the deceased; or
(d)Any agent duly authorized by such person or owner of legal representatives. CLND
Rules, supra note 1.
90
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period of ten years shall be computed from the date of such incident,
but in no case, shall exceed a period of twenty years from the date
of such theft, loss, jettison or abandonment.
Moreover, Section 15(2) and Section 31(2) of the CLND Act
pertaining to the procedure to be followed before respectively the
Nuclear Damage Claims Commissioner/Commission further states
that every application for compensation (by the victim against the
operator) before the Commission for nuclear damage shall “be made
within a period of three years from the date of knowledge of nuclear
damage by the person suffering such damage.”
Without quoting in full, but for the mere purpose of clarity
and illustration, Section 2(g) of the CLND Act defines “nuclear
damage” as: (i) loss of life or personal injury (including immediate
and long-term health impact) to a person; or (ii) loss of, or damage
to, property; or (iii) any economic loss, arising from the loss or
damage referred to in (i) or (ii); or (iv) costs of measures of
reinstatement of impaired environment caused by a nuclear incident
(unless such impairment is insignificant); or (v) loss of income
derived from an economic interest in any use or enjoyment of the
environment; or (vi) the costs of preventive measures and further
loss or damage caused by such measures; or (vii) any other
economic loss.
To be clear: Section 18 of the CLND Act prescribes the
limitation period in the relationship of victims versus the operator.
Only after that will the limitation period need to be calculated
within which the operator needs to file its right of recourse claim
against the supplier. As we know, Section 17(a) CLND Act covers
the situation where the right of recourse is agreed between parties
contractually (and in that case the time limit within which such right
of recourse can be relied upon will also be determined contractually
—see our discussion above in Section VI—A) whereas Section
17(b) must be treated as a stand-alone clause independently of
whether a right of recourse provision was inserted in the operatorsupplier contract or not.
As we have discussed (and will further illustrate in the case
law discussion below), in the absence of a contract determining the
contours of the right of recourse between the operator and the
supplier, common tort law will apply. Therefore, the limitation
period applicable to torts will determine the limitation period within
which the operator can rely on its right of recourse against the
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supplier, after the operator paid the victim(s) as per the Award of
the Nuclear Claims Commissioner/commission (and the limitation
period governing the victims-operator relationship). As per Part VII
of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, 92 pertaining to suits
relating to tort, the limitation period would be one year for
compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act alleged to be in
pursuance of any enactment in force, from the date when the act or
omission takes place. However, in the context of the right of
recourse claim by the operator against the supplier where he can
only activate as per the general heading of Section 17 CLND Act
“after paying the compensation for nuclear damage in accordance
with Section 6,” this one year limitation period as per the general
Limitation Act will necessarily have to be calculated from the date
that the operator paid the compensation for nuclear damage, as his
right to claim back (part of) the amount from the supplier by way of
right of recourse, will only start once he has met his own obligation
to first pay the victims as per the Award—only then can he start
exercising his right of recourse against the supplier, not before.93
Section 16(1) and Section 32(6) of the CLND Act specify
that respectively the Claims Commissioner/Claims Commission
after duly giving an opportunity of being heard to the parties,
dispose of the application within a period of three (3) months from
the date of such receipt of application and make an Award
accordingly.
Let’s take a purely hypothetical example:
a)

A nuclear incident occurred on 1st June 2015.

b)
As per Section 3(1) CLND Act, the AERB
notified the nuclear incident on 14 June 2015.
c)
The right to claim compensation for damage
shall extinguish, if it is not made before:
92

Limitation Act 1963 and Schedule (explaining the content of Part VII).
Limitation Act 1963, Schedule 72 (Eng.). Schedule 55 relates to compensation for
breach of any contract, and the limitation period would be three years, Limitation Act
1963, Schedule 55 (Eng.). For a discussion on UK Limitation Act applicable to latent and
patent defects in common law (which is distinct from the present situation), see
Christopher Wong, Liability After Take-Over: the English Position, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 5
2009),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8646cd6c-13e9-4818-b70d833689607a16 [https://perma.cc/5ZLB-VG2B].
93

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

2020]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

319

(i) 14th June 2025, in the case of damage to
property;
(ii) 14th June 2035, in the case of personal injury
to any person.
d)
A victim files a claim for compensation for
nuclear damage to its property on 15 February 2017,
before the expiry of the 10 year limitation period and
well within the three year knowledge period.
e)
The Claims Commissioner issues its Award
nd
on 2 April 2017, within the three month deadline
within which the CLND Act mandates him to render
its Award.
f)
The operator pays the victim within one
month from the date of the Award (to avoid paying
interest for delayed payment), for example, on 2nd
May 2017.
g)
After paying the victim on 2nd May 2017, the
operator’s limitation period of one year to rely on its
right of recourse against the supplier will expire on
2nd May 2018.
As pointed out by Saul and Hall Perloff, from a general
policy and business perspective, parties need to know at which point
their responsibilities end because without such “transactional
endpoint” persons (and their insurance companies) would be
reluctant to enter into binding agreements for fear that they might
never extricate themselves from potential liability.94 However, with
regards to the right of recourse in Section 17(b) CLNDA Act, the
time limits contractually specified for the Defect Liability Period,
will not impose a time limit on the Section 17(b) claim; in that case
only the standard limitation period to file claim for damages under
tort law, as per the Limitation Act, 1963, will apply.

94

Saul Perloff & Hal Perloff, Latent Defects in Government Contracts Law, 27 PUB.
CONT. L. 87, 89 (1997).
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We must pinpoint that the general understanding in the legal
community so far has been: either the latent defect liability period is
addressed in the contract and that contractual arrangement shall
govern the legal relationship between the parties, or if the parties
were silent on the liability for latent defects, the common law rules
will apply. The CLND Act has now created a situation by
disconnecting Section 17(b) from the contractual right of recourse
situation (Section 17(a)) and treating it as a stand-alone clause, that
even if the parties explicitly address and agree on how latent defects
need to be addressed, and the defects liability period for latent
defects expires, Section 17(b) will still give a separate ground to the
operator to claim money back from the supplier for the money it
paid to the victim as per the Award of the Claims Commissioner.
The difference, quite subtly but importantly being, that
whereas the contractual defect liability period focuses on the
liability to replace/remedy the latent defect, in the case of a right of
recourse by the operator against the supplier after having paid the
victims as per the Award, it no longer holds the supplier liable to
replace/remedy the latent defect, but rather to pay back the operator
for the (full / portion) of the amount it paid to the victims to the
extent of its contribution to the nuclear incident. The operator will
need to prove the liability for latent defects of the supplier as per
general rules of tort law, as will be discussed below.
Some authors, such as Somrey, Gouveia and Jones, are of
the view that – even independent of the context of the CLND Act—
the defect notification period only creates the obligation to put the
defect right, but does not address liability for the defect in general,
beyond the obligation to actually remedy the defect. Therefore, “the
common law remedy to claim damages is not extinguished since all
that the defect notification period does is limit the timeframe in
which the employer has the right to notify and compel the contractor
to return to site and make good the defects at the contractor’s own
expense.”95 This would also entail that after the expiry of the defect
notification
period
(whether
patent
or
latent),
the
purchaser/employer/operator no longer has the legal right to compel
the contractor/supplier to make good the defects that were notified
within the specified period, but that instead the
purchaser/employer/operator would have the right to file a claim for
95

Somrey, Gouveia & Jones, supra note 85.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

2020]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

321

damages against the contractor/supplier based on common law.96
As a result, once we move away from the pure contractual claims
and the meaning given therein to latent defects and patent defects
and their respective defective liability periods, and enter the tort law
realm of claims for damages based on negligence, the issue revolves
around establishing the three constituent elements of a tort (as
discussed above), to know: (1) a legal duty to exercise due care (by
the defendant); (2) a breach of the said duty (by the defendant); and
(3) consequential damage (suffered by the plaintiff). In other
words: once the claim does not relate to the breach of contract per
se, but is based on a right of recourse embedded in tort law, the
distinction between latent defects and patent defects will fade,97 and
the focus will be on proving the three constituent elements of a tort
of negligence (whether pertaining to latent or patent defects).

VII. CASE LAW RELATING TO LATENT DEFECTS
It must be clarified from the outset that in India there is no
case law pertaining directly to the meaning of “latent defects” in the
nuclear energy sector. That said, there is abundant case law
addressing the meaning of “latent defects” in a variety of other
contexts. Wherever possible, references will be made to case law in
the infrastructure sector or pertaining to mechanical defects, to a
large extent because the background in many infrastructure
contracts and relationships between a Purchaser of services/material
and a Supplier in the infrastructure field will be closely related to
the nuclear energy sector.
In Minu B. Mehta v. B.R. Nayan the Supreme Court rejected
the appeal by an insurance company which argued that the accident
was caused by a latent defect, in this case a mechanical failure,
instead of the rash driving of the lorry driver based on lack of
evidence. 98 It further states that the “owner is not liable if the
accident is due to a latent defect which is not discoverable by
96

Id.; Yassir Mahmood, Patent Defect Or Latent Defect: Does It Matter?, THOMSON
REUTERS:
PRAC.
L.,
CONSTRUCTION
BLOG,
(Jan.
21,
2014),
http://constructionblog.practicallaw.com/patent-defect-or-latent-defect-does-it-matter/
[https://perma.cc/BS6M-DN8C].
97 Mahmood, supra note 96.
98 Minu B. Mehta and Another v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan & Another, (1977) 2
SCC 441 (India).
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reasonable care” and further referred to Henderson v. Henry E.
Jenkins & Sons which posited the law on the subject. 99 In that case,
the lorry driver applied the brakes of the lorry on a steep hill but
which failed to operate, as result of which the lorry struck and killed
a man who was emerging from a parked vehicle. The defence was
that the brake failure was due to a “latent defect not discoverable by
reasonable care” on the driver’s part. Evidence was adduced and it
was found that the brake failure was due to a steel pipe bursting
caused by corrosion. The corrosion had occurred where it could not
be seen except by removing the pipe completely from the vehicle
(which had never been done). Expert evidence further showed that
it was not a normal precaution to do this if, as was the case, the
visible parts of the pipe were not corroded. The corrosion was
unusual and unexplained. An expert witness said it must have been
due to a chemical reaction of some kind such as exposure to salt
from the roads in winter or on journeys near the sea. The House of
Lords held that the burden of proof which lay on the defendants to
show that they had taken all reasonable care had been discharged in
this case. The defect remained undiscoverable despite due care. As
the evidence had shown that something unusual had happened to
cause this corrosion it was necessary for the defendants to show that
they neither knew nor ought to have known of any such unusual
occurrence to cause the breakdown.100
The above discussion in the Minu B. Mehta case clearly
shows that expert evidence pertaining to a particular sector will be
taken into account by the courts to understand whether a defendant
has met his standard of reasonable care or not. Similarly, in the
nuclear energy sector, if an operator were to file suit based on its
right of recourse, e.g. claiming that the supplier supplied equipment
which contained a latent defect, the supplier will try to prove that it
took all measures required from a supplier of his qualifications in
the ordinary course of his business in the nuclear sector.
Conversely, a supplier may also try to put up a contributory
negligence defence and try to establish that it was the Purchaser
who (partly) failed in his own duty of reasonable care as an
operator. Indeed, in most construction disputes relating to latent
defects, the defendant/supplier would try to establish that the defect
99
100

Henderson v. Henry E. Jenkins & Sons, (1970) AC 282 (India).
Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan & Another, (1977) 2 SCC 441, 14 (India).
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is not a latent defect and that the knowledge of the defect can be
inferred given that the plaintiff/operator should have discovered it
by, e.g. due diligence of conducting reasonable inspection. Again,
this will be a fact-based analysis, with analysis based on which type
of inspections a reasonable operator would have undertaken given
his expertise and given standard practice in the nuclear energy
sector. Quite obviously, with regard to nuclear power plants, the
question of whether a defect constituted a latent defect will not be
based on a layman’s understanding and his means of assessing
whether there was a latent defect, but the benchmark will be that of
a person possessing superior knowledge and expertise considered
reasonable for the nuclear energy sector.
In other words:
reasonableness and, for instance, what constitutes a reasonable
inspection will be sector-specific and based on a factual
determination, supported by the view and evidence of experts in the
field which both parties (plaintiff/defendant) will submit.101
Courts will also take the nature of the sector into account, in
terms of whether these are inherently dangerous activities and what
the fallout could be in the event of an accident. This will influence
the benchmark of reasonableness. For instance, in one of the oldest
aviation accident cases in the US, Maynard v. Stinson, the court
held the plane manufacturer answerable for taking precautions
which would have been commensurate with the damages which
would likely result in the absence of such precautions because “the
magnitude of possible harm in plane accidents is so serious, it does
not seem unreasonable to hold the manufacturer responsible for
taking almost all possible known safeguards” and further stated:
“Ordinary care in cases where the result of a slip will be slight and
unimportant is not sufficient care to fill the requirements of ordinary
care where the result of a failure to exercise it will be dangerous or
destructive to human life.”102
With regard to contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the
Supreme Court explained the legal position clearly in Pramodkumar
101
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Rasikbhai Jhaveri v Karmasey Tak (in the context of a car accident)
that the question of contributory negligence arises when there has
been some act or omission on the claimant’s part, which has
materially contributed to the damage caused, and is of such a nature
that it may properly be described as “negligence.” Negligence
ordinarily means breach of a legal duty to care, but when used in the
expression “contributory negligence” it does not mean breach of any
duty. It only means the failure by a person to use reasonable care
for the safety of either himself or his property, so that he becomes
blameworthy in part as an “author of his own wrong.” Subject to
non-requirement of the existence of duty, the question of
contributory negligence is to be decided on the same principle on
which the question of defendant’s negligence is decided. The
standard of reasonable man is as relevant in the case of plaintiff’s
contributory negligence as in the case of defendant’s negligence.
But the degree of want of care which will constitute contributory
negligence, varies with the circumstances and the factual situation
of the case. The following observation of the High Court of
Australia in Astley vs. Austrust Ltd. is worthy of quoting: “a finding
of contributory negligence turns on a factual investigation whether
the plaintiff contributed to his or her own loss by failing to take
reasonable care of his or her person or property.” What is
reasonable care depends on the circumstances of the case. In many
cases, it may be proper for a plaintiff to rely on the defendant to
perform its duty. But there is no absolute rule. The duties and
responsibilities of the defendant are a variable factor in determining
whether contributory negligence exists and, if so, to what degree. In
some cases, the nature of the duty owed may exculpate the plaintiff
from a claim of contributory negligence; in other cases, the nature
of the duty may reduce the plaintiff’s share of responsibility for the
damage suffered; and in yet other cases the nature of the duty may
not prevent a finding that the plaintiff failed to take reasonable care
for the safety of his or her person or property. Contributory
negligence focuses on the conduct of the plaintiff. The duty owed
by the defendant, although relevant, is one only of many factors that
must be weighed in determining whether the plaintiff has so
conducted itself that it failed to take reasonable care for the safety of
its person or property.103
103
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Furthermore, it is relevant to keep in mind that many
construction contracts have very detailed specifications regarding
quality tests and inspection procedures to establish whether e.g. the
delivered equipment meets the expected quality standards. If these
contractually agreed inspections are duly followed, it will act as
affirmative proof that the inspection was performed with reasonable
care by the Purchaser/operator and that he could not have
discovered the latent defect.104 Similarly, Purchaser-Contractor
contracts in the nuclear energy field in India, will contain clauses on
Quality Assurance, Inspection, Acceptance and Rejection, and in the
event of a claim by the operator against the supplier, the operator
will wants to establish that these contractual clauses were duly
followed. For instance, in order to provide assurance to the
Purchaser, the Contractor shall prepare a QA Manual based on the
Purchaser’s Quality Assurance (QA) Program, which the Purchaser
will review and needs to accept. The Quality Management System
of the Contractor will include aspects, such as: (i) the procedure for
purchase of materials, parts, components, including source
inspection, incoming raw material inspection, verification of
materials purchased, etc.; (ii) traceability of material used in the
production; (iii) control of non-conforming items and system for
corrective and preventive actions, including disposal of nonconforming items; (iv) inspection and test procedures for
manufacturing activities; (v) control of calibration and testing of
inspection, measuring and testing equipment; (vi) system of
indication and appraisal of inspection status; (vii) system of quality
audits; (viii) system for maintenance of records; etc.
The
Purchaser/operator will have the right to carry out random quality
checks. Moreover, the Purchaser/operator will appoint a Quality
Surveillance Engineer/Inspector who will inspect or carry out
quality surveillance on suppliers, stores or work under the Contract.
Also, the Project Manager appointed by the Purchaser, his duly
authorised representative, or even an appointed outside inspection
agency acting on behalf of the Purchaser, shall have at all
reasonable times access to the Contractor’s premises or facilities
and shall have the power at all reasonable times to inspect and

(India).
104
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examine the materials and workmanship during the manufacture
stage.
Keep in mind that the discovery of a defect during any of
such inspections would qualify the defect not as a latent defect, but
as a patent defect. However, the obligation is the same: the defect
needs to be remedied, albeit that a different defect liability period
would apply, i.e. latent defects attract a longer contractual defect
liability period precisely because it is generally accepted that latent
defects are more difficult to detect than patent defects. Here too, the
Purchaser would then have the contractual right to insist that the
Contractor replace / remedy the defect. We must also be mindful of
the fact that it is well-established in case law of common law
countries (both in terms of general tort law as well as specifically
pertaining to construction contracts) that a patent defect is one that
is “discoverable” even though it may not have been discovered by a
party. Indeed, in one of the often referred to early cases on the
subject, Sanderson v. National Coal Board,105 the Queen’s Bench
Division explained that a patent defect is not latent merely because
there is none to observe it or because it was not observed. The true
question is: was the defect observable by a reasonable person? If
the answer is affirmative, it will be treated as a patent defect.
Indeed, the Court in this case held that: “the natural meaning of the
word ‘patent’ is objective, not subjective. It means ‘observable’ not
‘observed’. A patent defect must be apparent on inspection, but it is
not dependent on the eye of the observer; it can blush unseen.”106
To explain more about the background of the ruling: the case
revolved a claim by a miner who had been injured by hooks sticking
out from a conveyor belt which badly injured his leg. The person
who was in charge of overseeing the conveyor belt submitted that it
was dark in the underground area and he could not observe the
hooks, the employer taking forward this argument as the defect
being latent and not patent. However, the Court clarified that it is
not a matter of whether the person in charge actually observed the
hooks (defect) sticking out of the conveyor belt, but whether at that
point in time the defect had become observable, in an objective
manner and could have been observed had they simply used more
light in that area. In other words: it is not a defence to merely state
105
106
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that a person/ inspector did not observe the defect; but whether the
defect could have been observed by a reasonable person/inspector
placed in the same circumstances, is the real point. Again, a critical
aspect which will be heavily based on the facts of each case and
evidence adduced by the parties.
Courts have reiterated the above reasoning of the Sanderson
case, and, for instance, held with regard to construction projects that
a defect will be patent if it is reasonably discoverable with the help
of skilled third party advice (or by analogy: skilled experts
directly).107
We must further add that in the case of a right of recourse
claim based on tort, a Judge will most certainly take into account
whether and how the parties followed the Quality Assurance and
Inspection steps and procedures as determined in the contract
between the parties, but will not be limited by it in the analysis of
the alleged tort. This is distinct from, for instance, the US case law
pertaining to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which
provides the US Government with a number of post-acceptance
contractual rights, including the revocation of acceptance of latently
defective work even after the defect liability period. In those
instances, the Government must establish that the latent defect
caused the failure of the work to meet contractual requirements.108
No such limitations would be applicable when addressing the right
of recourse claims by the operator against the supplier based on
Section 17(b) CLND Act; and US case pertaining to FAR must be
distinguished on that point (although it may remain relevant to
assess how latent defects were investigated and which type of
evidence was adduced). In the context of FAR-related case law,
contactors will often argue that a defect is not latent because it could
have been discovered had the Government conducted certain tests or
inspections. However, this argument will only prevail if conducting
such tests or inspections was reasonable under the circumstances.
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Here again, what will be considered as “reasonable” will heavily
depend on the facts of each particular case.109
Similarly, in the context of civil liability pertaining to
aviation
accidents
in
the
US,
courts
have
held
manufacturers/designers accountable only for the “knowledge and
skill possessed by an airplane designer in the year in which the
plane in dispute was designed. This has the effect of protecting the
manufacturer from the admission of hindsight evidence” when
assessing “ordinary care.”110 The same would be true for the
nuclear energy sector, where courts will take into account the
various design years of nuclear power plants and the components
supplied to it and the knowledge which a supplier would have (or
ought to have) had at the time of supplying components, or
designing a power plant, as well as the standard safety standards,
procedures and manuals applicable at that time pertaining to the
manufacture, assembly or installation, which a reasonable supplier
active in the nuclear sector would have had to follow as a minimum.
In Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. M. K. Nakum, the breach
of duty by a public authority was addressed.111 In this case a man
died when a tree in a public street fell on him under normal weather
conditions. Ultimately, the public authority was held not to be
liable. The Supreme Court reiterated that negligence is failure to
use such care that a reasonable, prudent and careful person would
use, under similar circumstances. In this case, the Court had to
analyse whether the defendant (municipal corporation) breached its
duty of care not to create a latent source of physical danger/damage
to a third party whom he ought to have reasonable foreseen as likely
to be affected thereby.112 The Court reviewed a long list of cases
pertaining to such falling of tree incidents (whether standing on
private or public property), including one case where a tree that had
fallen from the property of a landlord was proved to have been due
to a disease of the roots, but with no other external indication
aboveground that it was affected by the disease. After a detailed
examination of the evidence, the Court held that since there was no
109
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apparent evidence that the tree was affected with a disease, the
person (landlord) in question was held to have acted reasonably as
any other landlord would have done, as the landlord was not a
scientific expert in this field. Similarly, in the case at hand it was
held that the municipal corporation had no knowledge and could not
have had knowledge that a healthylooking tree would cause an
accident in perfectly normal weather conditions and thereby it did
not omit to fulfil its duty of care to prevent this accident. If,
however, the defendant had become aware of the decayed condition
of the tree or had the knowledge that the tree was affected by a
disease, but had taken no action to prevent the accident, in that case
it would have been actionable.113
There is abundant case law in India pertaining to the
meaning of latent and patent defects in the context of the sale of
goods. And the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 has the notion that there is
an implied warranty in the goods delivered that they should be free
of latent defects.114 For instance, in the case of Sorabji Hormusha
Joshi & Co. v. V.M. Ismail,115 the Madras High Court referred to
Section 16 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 on “implied conditions as
to quality or fitness” of goods, to define patent and latent defects. In
short, Section 16 states that subject to the provisions of the Sale of
Goods Act (and any other law being in force), there is no implied
warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular
purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale, except as
follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are
required, so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or
judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the
course of the seller’s business to supply (whether he is the
manufacturer or producer or not), there is an implied condition that
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose . . . ;
(2) Where goods are bought by description from a seller who
deals in goods of that description (whether he is the manufacturer or
producer or not), there is an implied condition that the goods shall
113
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be of merchantable quality: provided that, if the buyer has examined
the goods, there shall be no implied condition as regards defects
which such examination ought to have revealed.
The Madras High Court, reflecting on similar principles in
most common law countries, ruled that, Section 16 of the Act,
“divides all such defects into two kinds, often called patent and
latent defects. Patent defects are, those which can be found on
examination by a person of ordinary prudence with the exercise of
due care and attention. Latent defects are those which cannot be
discovered on such examination.” Hence, there is an implied
condition on the seller’s part that the goods are free from latent
defects; the condition exists even with regard to patent defects as
well, if there has been no examination of the goods by the buyer.116
These cases help in defining “latent defects” in the specific context
of sale of goods; and as a result many contracts will refer to this
standard definition of latent defects as well. This stream of case law
is also relevant for those contracts which did not explicitly address
the issue of latent defects, whereby the law will apply such an
implied clause of goods being free of latent defects.117
Similarly, US case law also confirms that a rather standard
understanding of “latent defects” is relied upon by courts, and will
often be interpreted to mean: “latent defects are generally
considered to be hidden or concealed defects which are not
discoverable by reasonable and customary inspection . . . .”118 For
instance, in Tricon-Triangle Contractors, a water line which had
been installed by a contractor started leaking after one year, where a
subsequent inspection revealed the nuts were not properly tightened
on the bolds holding the pipe flanges together. Here it was held that
the Government could not revoke its acceptance because this
situation did not qualify as a latent defect. Indeed, it was held that a
“latent defect cannot exist if by reasonable means it would have
been detected prior to acceptance.”119 But there are exceptions to
the rule in US case law (pertaining to the Federal Acquisition
116
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Regulation or FAR as discussed above) according to which
observable defects are necessarily patent. For instance, in Kaminer
Construction Corp. v. United States,120 the Court of Claims held
with regard to the construction of a crane that although not hidden
from sight, it was nevertheless a latent defect because only 8 out of
12,000-odd bolts were undersized and the size discrepancy was not
great, therefore the Government could not reasonably have been
expected to discover the mistake.121 One must add that the
threshold of reasonableness for both the operator and supplier in the
nuclear energy sector would be higher compared to mainstream
construction projects. Indeed, (although still in the context of the
FAR case law in the US), courts will not hesitate to assess whether a
more demanding inspection than the one specified in the contract
would have been reasonable under the circumstances and would
have revealed the presence of the latent defect. As mentioned
above, in the context of a Section 17(b) CLND Act right of recourse
claim for compensation, Indian courts are bound to also take into
account the contractual Quality Assurance, Inspection, Acceptance
and Rejection clauses, but will go further and beyond the
contractual clauses and assess what was reasonable in the specific
circumstances of that case in the nuclear energy sector.
Another difficulty with regard to any latent defect in the
goods/services supplied by a supplier which is alleged to have
contributed to the nuclear incident, is in the case where there is
more than one cause which contributed to the ultimate nuclear
incident. Just like with aviation accidents, nuclear accidents may
often be the result of a multitude of technical and human failures,
and recovery of damages will be limited to the portion of damages
that the operator/plaintiff establishes with reasonable accuracy to be
the result from these latent defects.122
Moreover, in such
construction-related disputes, very often the contractor will try to
defend the position according to which it is the improper use or a
design flaw which is to blame for the failure, rather than any error
on the part of the contractor.123 An analysis of aviation accidents
and nuclear power plant accidents often expose a confluence of
120
121
122
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multiple factors, possibly from both the operator as well as
suppliers, human errors and technical failures.124
We may also add here that within companies and industries
which focus heavily on safety culture and safety management there
is a strong focus on precisely trying to detect latent errors to make
their own effective safety management and workplace safety
systems more robust.125 For instance, within the nuclear energy
sector, experiences and lessons learned in terms of failures or best
safety practices are being shared at various levels (e.g. between
regulatory authorities, operators, nuclear energy agencies, etc.),
including relating to latent design deficiencies which “can remain
unidentified for a long time after the commissioning of the plant and
cause significant problems only after many years of operation.”126
The key take-away from the case law discussion above, is
that there is no one-size fits all general standard of reasonable care,
but that such tort cases are always based on the facts of each case,
taking into account the expertise of the respective parties, and will
revolve around understanding how a reasonable person in the same
circumstances in the same sector with the same expertise would
have acted, and to establish this benchmark specific to each case,
courts will heavily rely on the evidence from experts in that
particular field. Indeed, this seems to be inherent to the “factintensive nature of latent defects disputes.”127

VIII. INDIA NUCLEAR INSURANCE POOL AND ITS JOINT
RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
As mentioned, this Note’s intent is to focus on the notion of
“latent defects” in the situation where the operator decides to
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Simply Stop, Look and Listen, 101 SAFETY SCI. 305, 305–12 (2018); Justin R.E. Saward &
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APPLIED ERGONOMICS 104, 10413 (2017); M.S. Aini & A. Fakhru’l-Razi, Latent Errors of
Socio-technical Disasters, 51 SAFETY SCIENCE 284, 284–292 (2013).
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exercise its right of recourse under Section 17(b) CLND Act against
the supplier. Given the unique development under the Indian
Nuclear Insurance Pool (INIP) which precisely tries to address the
civil liability for nuclear damage claims, including between the
operator and the supplier, we must add a word on this specific
insurance mechanism as well.128
In June, 2015, INIP, the 27th nuclear insurance pool, was
formally launched, with the General Insurance Corporation of India
(GIC Re), being the Pool Manager, with a total capacity to be
achieved of Rs. 1,500 Crores (about USD 237,5 million),
corresponding to the capped liability amount resting on the operator
as specified in Section 6(2) of the CLND Act. Most interestingly is
that INIP was also mandated to cover the risks of the suppliers
under Section 17(a) and Section 17(b) of the CLND Act via an
insurance policy for suppliers to cover their right of recourse risk.
Quite understandably, the right of recourse situation foreseen under
Section 17(c) CLND Act pertaining to the intentional act of an
individual is not covered. Hence, INIP will issue two types of
policies: a) Nuclear Operator’s Liability (CLND Act 2010)
Insurance policy; and b) Nuclear Supplier’s Insurance Policy (Right
to Recourse only under CLND Act, 2010).
GIC Re along with 11 other non-life insurers have gathered
about 2/3 of the required capacity so far,129 and the balance capacity
will be contributed by the Government on a tapering basis.130 We
must add here that the international insurance market has not
committed any capacity or reinsurance support to INIP based on
various concerns relating to this unique insurance construct
(including relating to risk inspection, pricing, etc.).
The first Operator’s Policy was issued to the Nuclear Power
Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) on 26 May, 2016; and the
Supplier’s Policy was unveiled shortly after in August, 2016.
However, no such supplier policy has been issued to a supplier yet
as on date.
128
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We may have to insert an intermezzo here, pertaining to the
situations where NPCIL assumes the role of supplier, as defined
under Rule 24(2)(b) of the CLND Rules,131 in contracts where
NPCIL is the system designer and technology owner, being
responsible for safety designs of such installations.
More
specifically, this would be the case for the indigenously designed
Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs). In other words, in
such contracts relating to PHWRs designed by NPCIL, NPCIL will
contractually agree to be the supplier for the purpose referred to
under the CLND Act and Rules. As a result, in such situations it
will not necessarily rely on its right of recourse against the supplier,
given that NPCIL itself will be deemed to be the supplier. Here,
with NPCL being both the operator and the supplier, NPCIL will
not be taking a separate supplier policy under the INIP regime and
only an operator policy will be issued.
This is the unique approach taken by NPCIL as on date,
although it remains to be seen how long this contractual practice
will prevail where NPCIL assumes the role of both operator and
supplier for its indigenously designed PHWRs.
The further discussion below builds on all the other
situations, not pertaining to the PHWRs designed by NPCIL, and
where NPCIL will not assume the role as supplier for the purpose of
the right of recourse provision.
Given that INIP would be issuing insurance policies to both
the operator as well as the suppliers, it would be subrogated in both
the rights of the operator as well as the supplier, if the operator
decides to exercise its right of recourse. It must be noted that as
much as it is legally mandatory for the operator to take out an
insurance policy or other financial security to cover its liability
(Section 8 of the CLND Act), no such corresponding obligation
rests on the supplier. However, most suppliers may decide to opt
for this “joint risk management” approach, with corresponding
subrogation by the Pool Manager, rather than having a right of
131 Rule 24(2)(b) CLND Rules contains an explanation of the term “supplier” which
“shall include a person who—
(i)Manufactures and supplies, either directly or through an agent, a system, equipment or
component or builds a structure on the basis of functional specification; or
(ii)Provides build to print or detailed design specifications to a vendor for manufacturing a
system, equipment or component or building a structure and is responsible to the operator
for design and quality assurance; or
(iii)Provides quality assurance or design services.” CLND Rules, supra note 1.
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recourse litigation fought out in court, based on regular fault-based
tort law principles, as discussed above.
This proposed insurance-based approach is based on trying
to make the operator and suppliers as “partners managing a risk
together.”132 While staying within the four corners of the CLND
Act, the approach is certainly not built on a pure insurance logic,
given that it can be argued that the same risk would be insured
twice. This avoidance of multiple coverages of the same risk, is
reminiscent of some of the discussions which took place in the
1950s during the discussions reflected in the Harvard Report, and
which precisely underpin some of the unique nuclear law principles,
such as legal channelling (or economic channelling in the US) and
restricting the right of recourse grounds by the operator against the
supplier, in deviation of regular tort law.133
We further understand that INIP and its policy holders may
also want to devise an alternative dispute resolution mechanism,
possibly akin to arbitration with (pre-agreed) expert arbitrators, to
avoid lengthy litigation between the operator and the supplier,
particularly because if the supplier opts to obtain an INIP Supplier
Policy, INIP would be subrogated in the rights of both parties.
Quite clearly it will be very important to identify independent
experts whom both parties accept. We must flag that for suppliers
who would not have opted for an INIP Supplier Policy, their legal
right to defend themselves before regular civil courts would remain
unfettered.
As we have mentioned above with reference to infrastructure
contracts in the real estate sector in India, the issuance of Latent
Defects Insurance (LDI) policies are on the rise. In this context they
cover the legal obligation of the developers to rectify latent defects
up to five years from the date of handing over the possession of the
unit, in line with the new RERA legislation. As part of this LDI
policy, the insurance companies also appoint an “Independent
Technical Inspection Service Company” to carry out monitoring
activities throughout the course of construction on the quality of the
building, who will thereafter provide detailed reports and feedback
on the quality of the construction as an independent expert party. A
similar ongoing independent third party technical review
132
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mechanism, (provided that the necessary independent technical
expertise can be found), not necessarily binding in itself but as a
reliable barometer of “reasonableness,” could be envisaged under
the INIP mechanism as well. And given the fact-intensive nature of
any right of recourse claim from an operator against a supplier, the
mechanism could benefit both parties, whether ultimately
adjudicated before a regular civil court or an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism.

IX. CONCLUSION
We have highlighted how nuclear law, with its unique
characteristics based on the nuclear law principles which are
reflected in both the international Vienna and Paris regimes as well
as domestic legislations, such as the CLND Act, will be interpreted
by Judges as the applicable lex specialis.
Other inherently hazardous industries, or rather sectors
where incidents qualify as high-impact, low-probability events, and
with possible transboundary effects, such as the aviation and
maritime sectors, also have unique legal rules that govern their
sector. Moreover, the notion of strict liability is not unique to the
nuclear energy sector but can be found back in many jurisdictions
with respect to civil liability of industries engaged in inherently
hazardous activities. However, the principle of legal channelling of
the liability exclusively to the operator, remains a unique
characteristic to the nuclear energy sector.
The public policy debate on precisely how much this special
nuclear law regime should be allowed to deviate from standard tort
law principles can be traced back to discussions which preceded the
adoption of the 1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Vienna
Convention. As we have seen, many of the same arguments and
diverging views were reflected in the Parliamentary debates prior to
the adoption of the CLND Act as well.
As discussed, parties to the respective Paris and Vienna
Conventions ultimately agreed that the civil liability ought, from a
public policy perspective, be channelled to the operator exclusively
and that the operator’s right of recourse against the supplier should
be limited to two grounds: (1) when the parties agree so
contractually; and (2) in the event of where an individual
intentionally caused the damage.
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As we have seen, business practice between contracting
parties or in government agreements in the nuclear energy field has
evolved such over the years that no such right of recourse is
typically inserted in operator-supplier agreements.
We have also touched upon the fact that the contractual
liability of latent defects is typically included in all operatorsupplier contracts in India, in line with international infrastructure
practice, but in such situations the aim is to ensure the supplier
remedies the latent defects; whereas a right of recourse claim
instituted by the operator would essentially seek to recover
monetarily what it was mandated to pay to the victims by an Award
of the Nuclear Commissioner/Nuclear Damage Claims Commission.
The CLND Act adopted in 2010 triggered a fresh debate by
inserting a stand-alone right of recourse clause, Section 17(b) of the
CLND Act, where the nuclear incident has resulted as a
consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, which includes
supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or substandard services. Clearly, Section 17(b) is even more open-ended
and not just limited to situations of patent and latent defects in
material, equipment or services provided to the operator.
Nevertheless, this Note sought to particularly focus on case law
pertaining to “latent defects” given its inherent difficulty and
evidentiary challenges.
Such reliance on general case law
pertaining to latent defects is appropriate given that the legal
relationship between the operator and the supplier in a right of
recourse claim based on Section 17(b) of the CLND Act would be
governed by general tort law principles.
It is well-established based in a long line of case laws in
common law countries that latent defects are defects not
discoverable by reasonable care. However, an analysis of what
constitutes “reasonable care” is very fact and context specific and
will heavily rely on factual determinations, supported by the view
and evidence of experts in the field. Courts will also take the nature
of the sector into account, in terms of whether these are inherently
dangerous activities and what the fallout could be in the event of an
accident. This will influence and heighten the benchmark of
reasonableness.
Courts will also take into account the various design years of
nuclear power plants and the components supplied to it and the
knowledge which a supplier would have (or ought to have) had at
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the time of supplying components, or designing a power plant, as
well as the standard safety standards, procedures and manuals
applicable at that time pertaining to the manufacture, assembly or
installation, which a reasonable supplier active in the nuclear sector
would have had to follow as a minimum at that particular time.
The key take-away from the case law analysis is that there is
no one-size fits all general standard of reasonable care, but that such
tort cases are always based on the facts of each case, taking into
account the expertise of the respective parties, and will revolve
around understanding how a reasonable person in the same
circumstances in the same sector with the same expertise would
have acted. To establish this benchmark specific to each case,
courts will rely heavily on the evidence from experts in that
particular field. Indeed, this seems to be inherent to the “factintensive nature of latent defects disputes.”
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